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STATEHENT OF THE CASE
This is a brief in opposition to an appeal from an
order revoking Appellant's driver's license.
DISPOSITION IN LO\vER COURT
On May 17, 1977, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.,
reviewed the order of the Department of Public Safety revoking
Appellant's driver's license and upheld the order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the lower court's determination
affirmed.
STATE11ENT OF THE FACTS
On January 26,

19~7,

Appellant was arrested and charged

with driving under the influence of alcohol.

On being brought

to tre police station, Appellant was asked to submit to a breathalyzer test after being informed of the implied consent law.
Appellant refused to take the breathalyzer test.
Respondent,

Georgia R. Shaw, reviewed these facts, took

testimony, and revoked Appellant's license effective March 19,
1977.

The District Court Judge then found that the petitioner

unreasonably refused to submit to a chemical test to determine
the alcoholic content of his blood pursuant to the laws of the
State of Utah (R, 10).
ARGUEMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURTS FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST lvAS UNREASONABLE SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT.
This court in Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197 (1975)

~
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stated a well-known principle
ofOCR,
appellate
Machine-generated
may contain errors.law, "lve do not re-

verse the trial judge unless he clearly ~oes violence to
as they relate to his findings."

The facts of this case

applicable law clearly support the Distirct Court's

the ,
and

~

detern:inat_

that Appellant's refusal was unreasonable.
Respondent disagrees

w~th

the statement in A
PPellant•

brief that "The alternate test (blood) was readily available"
(No transcipt was designated by the Appellant).

The facts,,•er,

that the breathalyzer test was readily available while the blo:
alcohol test was not.

The officer made that clear to the Ap-

pellant, explained it, read him the statute and then designatec
the test to be t&ken.

The trial court obviously believed

t~u

facts.
The Appellant, would put the shoe on the >·n·ong foot
and have the officer tried for unreasonableness.
actions are not on re-trial.

The officer's

The only reason given and argued:

the Appellant for refusing the breathalyzer test is that he believed it to be unreliable.

Under these facts, if tte officH

were on trial, he would have acted reasonably in request.i~~
breathalyzer test anyway.

So found the trial court and we ask

this court to uphold that finding.
POINT II
APPELLANT DID IN FACT UNREASONABLY REFUSE ~0
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST PURSUANT TO UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 41-6-44.10.
Appellant • s brief attempts to use Elliot v. Doriur.,
557 p. 2d 759

(1976), to argue the position that if the order

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

·:Nking Ap~ellant's license is not overturned, this court

~ld be granting police officers absolute power to determine which
~est is to be us<d.

Elliot seems to support this necessary

,esult and in no way supports the Appellant's case.

In fact, the

holding of Elliot could dictate the necessary outcome of the case
at tar, ie., that since tte alternate test was not readily availilile, Appellant's refusal to take the available breathalyzer test

,:as unreasonable, whether available or not.

By statute, the

test requested is presumed to be a reliable and reasonable one.
Appellant contends his refusal was not unreasonable
c'ue to his fear of the unreliability of the breathalyzer test
a~

that he should be given the choice.

This court in Elliot

stated:
In construing the meaning of reasonable
cause, in this subsection, ((c) of Utah
Code Annotated 44-6-44.10), it is significant the person is granted the right to
submit to a 'chemical test,' the choice of
which is by statute, determined by the arresting officer. A stated preference for
anothe= chemical test is not a reasonable
cause for refusal of a req~<ested test .
•.• A person may not unilaterally determine
one of the tests designated in subsection
(a} of 41-6-44.10 to be unreliable; then
on that alone, claim his refusal to submit
to such test was with reasonable cause •
•• . Plaintiff claims the subsection by the
police officer, denied him a reliable test.
Such is without merit. A chemical test
specified by statute may not be deemed unreliable as a matter of law. The statute
~pecifically designates the arresting officer
as the one to determine the test to be administered.
(Emphasis added) .
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The foregoing quotes demonstrate this court'

.
s ln-

terpretation of the Utah Implied Consent Statute.
All tests i:
dicated in the statute, including the breathalyzer t
Est, are
deened by law to be realiable and reasonable.
The officer de.
cides which test is to be taken.
Nhen one is asked to submit
to a particular test, he must, on his refusal to sub ·
ml t is ther.
reviewed to determine if the refusal was reasonable.
This
court, as quoted above, said that a stated preference f
chemical test and a fear that a particular test is

or anotr_,
1'

unre lable a:

not solely reasonable causes for a refusal tc· take a p t'
ar lCUlar!
test.
rr.erit.

This Appellant's only contention is, therefore,

ldthout

The sole fact that the blood test requested, but was

not readily available and would have caused undue delay and ris(
of losing the evidence, is an unreasonc:.ble ground for refusal,
If he had some other valid reasons for refusal, the appellant
might have been reasonable, but such is not the trial court's
finding on the facts of this case.
The above construction of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-4L
was incorporated into the code via amendment by the 1977 Utah
Legislature.

The 1977 amendments tc. this section provide

I

in no

uncertain terms that the officer has discretion as to whtch test!
used and the tests are presumed to be reliable.
tests h.:;ve been used for· years) .

(Breathalyzer :

Subsection A of the latest

statute grants the right to a contemporaneous test if dE":sired.
POINT III
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AND EFFICIENTLY NITH

U~SAFF

DRIVERS.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Dixon v. Love, on May 16, 1977,
~eld an Illinois law authorizing revocation or suspension of

U,

a drivers license without preliminary hE,arings.

The court rulec1

that holding prehearings in every case would impede administrative efficiency and prove a danger to the public on the high\vays.
This is just one example of how state courts are tightening their
drunJ:: driving laws. The 1977 amendments to its Implied Consent
La\v show a definite concern for public safety.

The policy behind

these amendments is obviously due to undue delay tactics.

•

Keeping

1

I

the highways safe for the innocent driver seems certainly present
10

this court's construction of the implied consent statt•tes

even before the stattctory amendments v<ent into effect.

Utah's

'udicial decisions and legislative enactments have also reflected
concern with the drunk driving problem.

The District Court's

finding certainly is in accord \vi th policy and holdings by this
court.
CONCLUSION
This court's statutory interpretation of the applicable
la1·1 gives the peace officer discretion as to which available

stl
1

chemical test is to be used.

The facts and applicable law

clearly show that Appellant's refusal to take the breathalyzer
test was unreasonable.

A refusal to take the test offered due

to fear of its unreliability and/or a stated preference for another
test is clearly an unreasonable refusal.
Respondent requests this court to uphold tl:.e Trial
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Dl'.TED this

day of - - - - - - - - - · 1978.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBF.RT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt LakE City, Utah

84114

BRUCE l1. HALE
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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